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ABSTRACT
I suppose that consumers see a firm as fair if they cannot reject the hypothesis that the firm is
somewhat benevolent towards them. Consumers that can reject this hypothesis become angry, which
is costly to the firm. I show that firms that wish to avoid this anger will keep their prices rigid under
some circumstances when prices would vary under more standard assumptions. The desire to appear
benevolent can also lead firms to practice both third-degree and intertemporal price discrimination.
Thus, the observation of temporary sales is consistent with my model of fair prices. The model can
also explain why prices seem to be more responsive to changes in factor costs than to changes in
demand that have the same effect on marginal cost, why increases in inflation seem to affect mostly
the frequency of price adjustment without having sizeable effects on the size of price increases and






jrotemberg@hbs.eduThis paper proposes a model of what it means for prices to be fair and shows that its
implications are consistent with several pricing practices as well as with many reactions of
consumers both in laboratory settings and in actual markets. The central assumption of
the model is that consumers require that ¯rms demonstrate a minimum level of altruism
towards them. This means that prices must be responsive to consumer preferences in ways
that di®er from the usual ones. If, in particular, consumers experience disappointment when
they suddenly face increased prices, ¯rms that act with the required level of benevolence
must keep their prices somewhat rigid.
A search in Google gives 751000 hits for \fair price" while there are somewhat under
57000 for \equilibrium price". This ¯ts with the ease that laboratory subjects have in
answering questions about whether particular pricing patterns are fair. Such views have been
elicited in the pioneering study by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), and have led to an
extensive literature which is reviewed by Xia, Monroe and Cox (2004). An important ¯nding
of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) is that many respondents regard it as unfair for
a ¯rm to raises the price of an item whose demand has suddenly increased as a result of a
change in the weather. By contrast, they generally regard it as fair if a ¯rm increases its
prices when the price of its inputs rise. Interestingly, these notions of fairness appear to be
re°ected in actual pricing practices. Firms often do increase their prices when costs rise. On
the other dramatic increases in demand such as those caused by hurricane alerts are often
accompanied by constant prices for emergency supplies, and stores often run out.
For example, stores in Baton Rouge, Louisiana ran out of generators, duct tape, °ash-
lights and batteries on the eve of a hurricane in 2002.1 A remarkable story of constant prices
in response to a hurricane warning is reported in The Washington Post of September 19,
2003.2 It reports that store manager Paul Ginetti, whose store had run out of °ashlights
priced at $4.97 each, managed to locate 1000 °ashlights from an alternate manufacturer. At
¯rst he sold these for $4.97, but his supervisor made him raise their price to $11.98 when
1\Residents rushing to prepare for Isidore's visit", The Baton Rouge Advocate, September 25, 2002.
2The story ran under the heading \A Customer Flood for Home Depot; Va. Store Struggles To Meet
Demand."
1he learned that this was the list price for these °ashlights. Some customers complained and,
perhaps in part for this reason, Paul Ginetti later obtained permission from his supervisor
to lower the price of these °ashlights back to $4.97. Firms that act di®erently and do raise
prices after a calamity raises demand, do so at their peril. The L.A. Times of January 30,
1994, for example, reported that irate consumers threatened stores that raised prices after
an earthquake with boycotts.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler's (1986) theory to explain their ¯ndings is that fairness
considerations lead to a \dual entitlement." As they put it \Transactors have an entitlement
to the terms of the reference transaction and ¯rms are entitled to their reference pro¯t."
Reference transactions often refer to those that occurred in the recent past and, similarly,
reference pro¯ts are those that the ¯rm earned in the past.
This way of theorizing about fair prices appears to have three advantages. First, it ¯ts
well with the view that ethical behavior involves the heeding of absolute norms, since fairness
in prices is de¯ned by the requirement that ¯rms respect certain rights. Second, it appears
somewhat symmetric since both consumers and ¯rms seem to be entitled to something
they obtained in the past. In practice, however, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) do
not treat these two rights symmetrically: consumers are only entitled to the terms of their
reference transaction when this does not threaten ¯rm pro¯ts, otherwise the rights of ¯rms to
change prices take precedence. Third, it seems to account for the unfairness of raising prices
when demand rises due to a change in climactic conditions, since such a price increase would
not only violate the norm against altering the terms of the consumers reference transaction
but would also be unnecessary for protecting the sellers' pro¯ts (since these presumably rise
together with sales even if prices stay constant.)
Unfortunately, the \dual entitlement" principle poses three types of di±culties. First,
the consumers' entitlement to the "terms of the reference transaction" captures quite poorly
what consumers consider fair when demand rises suddenly. Consumers do regard it as fair if
posted prices stay constant in these cases, but they realize perfectly well that this often leads
2to rationing.3 Rationed consumers do not receive the \terms of the reference transaction",
indeed they do not even meaningfully face an unchanged price since the e®ective price at
which they can obtain the item has suddenly become in¯nite.
The second problem with the principle is that there are many changes in circumstances
where it is impossible to maintain ¯rm pro¯ts, even if the ¯rm were willing to violate the
consumer's entitlement by changing prices. When there is a real increase in a factor's price,
for example, even a ¯rm that increases its price optimally will often experience a fall in real
pro¯ts since its quantity sold will fall. Thus, in these circumstances, neither entitlement can
be met, and the principle seems to lack any prediction for what price will be regarded as
fair.
Lastly, the \dual entitlement principle" seems inconsistent with many fairness judgments
in the laboratory. Dickson and Kalapurakal (1994), in particular, show that purchasers do
not regard it as fair for prices to stay constant when costs fall, even though this is consistent
with the principle. Along the same lines, maintaining a constant level of pro¯ts when factor
costs rise requires that prices increase by more than marginal cost so that the ¯rm makes
up for its loss in volume. However, Bolton, Warlop and Alba (2003) show that ¯rms that
increase their price by more than the increase in their marginal cost are more likely to be seen
as unfair. Thus the \dual entitlement" principle often fails to provide meaningful guidance
about what prices would be fair and o®ers a prescription which seems incorrect in other
cases.
The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative theory for fair prices. This theory seeks
to explain not only the answers people give in the laboratory to questions regarding what
prices they regard as fair but also tries to rationalize actual pricing practices. I focus not
only on the responses to drastic changes in demand like those I just discussed, but also on
four aspects of price rigidity that seem di±cult to explain with models where this rigidity is
due only to administrative costs of changing prices. The ¯rst of these aspects is that many
3What is more, 76% of Frey and Pommerehne's (1993) respondents regarded it as fair if 100 available
bottles of water were distributed among 200 thirsty hikers on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served basis, while 73%
regarded it as unfair if a higher price was used to allocate the limited supply of water.
3stores hold temporary sales where prices fall temporarily only to return to their pre-special
price when the sale is over. The second is that, as emphasized by Bils and Chang (2000)
prices seem to be more responsive to changes in factor cost than to changes in demand that
have the same e®ect on marginal cost. The third is that increases in in°ation seem to be
accompanied mostly by an increase in the frequency of price adjustment, and only marginally
by an increase in the size of the typical price increase. As I discuss below, this is not what the
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) model predicts for standard speci¯cations of demand. Lastly,
many ¯rms announce their price increases in advance. By contrast, Benabou (1989) shows
that models with only administrative costs of changing prices predict nearly the opposite.
In models of this sort, ¯rms would like to prevent customers from buying goods in advance
of price increases and this leads ¯rms to surprise their customers with unexpected price
increases. Pre-announcing price increases facilitates this customer speculation instead.
The theory I propose hinges on two key assumptions. The ¯rst is that consumers expect
¯rms to be somewhat altruistic towards them and that they react with anger if ¯rms prove to
be insu±ciently altruistic.4 The fear of angry reactions then leads ¯rms to act as if they were
altruists regardless of whether they feel true benevolence towards consumers. The second
key assumption is that consumers experience a loss over and above their loss in real income
when they learn something that makes them wish they had carried out a di®erent set of
transactions at an earlier time. As discussed by Bell (1983), this loss is best thought of as
regret. In my context, consumers experience this regret when they must pay more for an
object that they could easily have obtained at a lower price earlier. In this way, the \terms
of the reference transaction" that play such a central role in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1986) play an important role here as well.
However, I suppose that consumers are also upset when they are no longer able to buy a
good that was available earlier, since this ought to generate at least as much regret as having
to pay a higher price for a good. By keeping its price constant, a ¯rm prevents the regret of
4This idea also underlies Rotemberg (2002) whose focus, however, is on short term macroeconomic °uc-
tuations and whose motivation for price rigidity is not based on regret.
4customers that obtain the good at the old price at the cost of ensuring the regret of those
who are rationed. As long as the latter are su±ciently less numerous than the former, it
becomes possible for an altruistic ¯rm to prefer to keep its price unchanged.
There is independent evidence for both the assumptions that consumers care about the
benevolence of ¯rms, and that they wish to avoid regret. According to Connolly and Zee-
lenberg (2002), regret is \the emotion that has received the most attention from decision
theorists." Much of the empirical research on regret involves asking subjects about the ex-
tent to which they regret various actions and outcomes. For example, Cooke, Meyvis and
Schwartz (2001) demonstrate that subjects taking the role of consumers express regret (and
are unsatis¯ed) if they pay high prices for a product after the product was available at a
lower price. This regret (and reduction in satisfaction) is larger if consumers are \forced"
to make the purchase because they have \run out of the good". This displeasure could, by
itself, be interpreted as being simply the result of a loss in real income. There is, however,
evidence that people are willing to pay not to learn what would have happened had they
followed alternate courses of action.5 In the study of Cooke, Meyvis and Schwartz (2001),
subjects have a di®erent reservation price for a good depending on whether they do or do
not subsequently learn the price at which it becomes available later. Since the actual income
of the purchasers is independent of the price they would have paid had they not purchased
(and since subjects are made unhappy by low future prices that indicate, if anything, higher
future income) it seems that subjects su®er a direct loss in utility if they learn they could
have done better through alternate courses of action.
There is also some evidence that consumers wish ¯rms to be benevolent. First, ¯rms
spend nontrivial resources touting the loftiness of their their goals. Johnson & Johnson, for
example, heavily advertises its 50-year old one-page \corporate credo" which begins with:
\We believe our ¯rst responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and
fathers and all others who use our products and services. In meeting their needs everything
we do must be of high quality. We must constantly strive to reduce our costs in order to
5This is the essence of Bell's (1983) model of regret.
5maintain reasonable prices." Shareholders are mentioned last, and the credo ends with the
words \When we operate according to these principles, the stockholders should realize a fair
return."6 It is conceivable that this ¯rm is just \burning money" through this publicity, but
too much e®ort is spent emphasizing the content of this message to make this interpretation
plausible.
Campbell (1999) provides more direct evidence that consumers approve of benevolent
acts by ¯rms. She asked her respondents about the fairness of various mechanisms that a
toy store could use for allocating a single doll that it found in its warehouse just before
Christmas, when the doll was in short supply. As in the studies discussed above, auctioning
the doll to the highest bidder and keeping the proceeds was widely seen as unfair. On the
other hand, auctioning the doll and giving the proceeds to charity was commonly regarded
as fair. This can be interpreted as saying that benevolent ¯rms are seen in a better light
than ones that seeks only to maximize pro¯ts. It also ¯ts more generally with ¯rms' e®ort
to trumpet their charitable activities.
A nearly immediate implication of ¯rm benevolence is that ¯rms with market power would
like to charge less to customers whose marginal utility of income is higher. The reason is
that such ¯rms gain less total utility from extracting an additional dollar from someone who
values it highly than they do from extracting an additional dollar from people who value it
less. This desire to treat di®erent customers di®erently could rationalize temporary sales if
individuals with higher marginal utility of income are more likely to take advantage of these
sales. Surprisingly, temporary sales arise out of ¯rm altruism even if all customers have the
same marginal utility of income and the same elasticity of demand. The reason, as I show,
is that temporary sales can often be a particularly e®ective way to charge less on average
than a sel¯sh ¯rm would.
This model obviously does not establish that temporary sales are a manifestation of ¯rm
altruism. However, it does establish that consumers who observe temporary sales should not
necessarily be upset with ¯rms for their lack of benevolence. This is important because the
6See, for example, http://www.jnj.com/our company/our credo history/index.htm.
6paper shows that constant prices are often a good policy for ¯rms that want to prove their
altruism, and temporary sales obviously represent a departure from this. One big di®erence
between this departure and other price variations is that those individuals who do not take
advantage of the sale tend to be those that do not even become aware of its existence. This
lack of awareness leads them not to be disappointed when they purchase at the same regular
price that prevailed the previous time they observed the item's price.
Before proceeding, it is worth discussing brie°y another alternative to using altruism as
a model for fairness in pricing. Huppertz, Arenson and Evans (1978) de¯ne fair prices as
involving an \equitable distribution of the bene¯ts" from the exchange between consumers
and ¯rms. This is similar in spirit to the preferences considered in Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) where individuals have preferences for relatively equal
outcomes. One bit of evidence against this hypothesis is provided by Huppertz, Arenson
and Evans (1978) themselves. They show that consumers who receive a better deal tend
to see ¯rms as treating more fairly, so that an orientation towards the welfare of customers
seems to be associated with fairness. Second, if this theory were correct, the role of fairness
considerations in pricing would have to be fairly limited because, in practice, the distribution
of \bene¯ts" between customers and ¯rms - where these bene¯ts are admittedly di±cult to
de¯ne and measure - seems to depend heavily on industry characteristics. Market power, in
particular, plays a large role on the extent to which ¯rms appropriate such bene¯ts.
Along the same lines, ¯rms that make considerable losses are not always seen as fair.
Even ¯rms in ¯nancial trouble are quite likely to be seen as unfair if, as emphasized by
Campbell (1999), their acts are construed as having insu±ciently positive intent. Letting
customers focus on a ¯rm's altruism has the advantage of ensuring that the intent of ¯rms
does indeed play a central role in customer attitudes. Lastly, as shown in Rotemberg (2004),
a focus on altruism by no means precludes obtaining equilibria where outcomes are equal.
Indeed, Rotemberg (2004) shows an altruism-based model quite similar to the one considered
here induces equal splits in ultimatum games with more reasonable parameter values than
those that are necessary to justify such splits if one uses the preferences in Fehr and Schmidt
7(1999) or those in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces my preferences for consumers
and ¯rms and shows that ¯rms that want to appear altruistic will practice third degree price
discrimination. They will, in particular, seek to give price breaks to individuals with a higher
marginal utility of income. Section 2 studies how prices of such ¯rms change when there are
changes in demand and cost conditions that are known su±ciently far in advance that the
¯rm can change its production volume. I consider changes in demand that are so sudden
that it is di±cult to increase quantity supplied in the following section, and this is where
I introduce price rigidity due to consumer regret. Section 4 is devoted to temporary sales.
Section 5 turns its attention to a setting where, in spite of the resulting customer regret,
the ¯rm changes its price regularly because there is constant in°ation. This allows me to
contrast the present model of price rigidity with that of Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), which
involves only administrative cost of price changes. I focus particularly on the desirability of
pre-announcing price increases and on the e®ects of changes in the rate of in°ation on the
frequency of price adjustment. Section 6 concludes.
1 Preferences
I suppose that individual preferences are quite similar to those in Rotemberg (2004) so that
the psychological well-being of agent i is given by
Wi = xi + [¸i ¡ »(^ ¸j; ¹ ¸i)]xj (1)
where xi is agent i's \material payo®, i.e. the part of his utility that is independent of the
outcomes for the other agent, ¸i is the agent's altruism parameter while the variable ^ ¸j
represents the beliefs of agent i about ¸j. The function » takes a value ¹ » which is greater
than ¸i if agent i can reject the hypothesis that ¸j ¸ ¹ ¸i and equals zero otherwise. This
means that agent i is willing to incur costs to in°ict harm on agent j if he can reject the
hypothesis that the latter's altruism is at least equal to ¹ ¸i. Otherwise, he feels some altruism
and gains utility when the agent is better o® as a result of agent i's actions.
8My focus is on a ¯rm, which sets a price, and on its consumers, who decide how much
to buy from the ¯rm. I am neglecting other actions by consumers, though angry consumers
are often able to in°ict damage on ¯rms in other ways than by stopping their purchases.
Consumers who are upset at ¯rms also complain loudly, and it seems likely that this is
unpleasant for ¯rm owners (either directly or because it leads to unhappy employees that
require some form of compensation). In addition, angry consumers can mobilize politicians
against ¯rms, and it seems likely that this is costly to ¯rms even it does not lead to regulatory
changes.7 The threat of political movements against ¯rms may well have a very di®erent
e®ect on individual ¯rm behavior than the threat of the cessation of purchases I study here,
because the e®ect of the former on any individual ¯rm may well be quite unrelated to this
particular ¯rm's actions.8 In part for this reason, I ignore these other reactions in this paper,
and focus on consumer purchases only. As will become apparent below, a high » leads to
a reduction - and even to a complete cessation - in purchases when consumers are angry .
In some cases this is the empirically relevant outcome, particularly when the picketing of a
store by angry consumers drives away other consumers.9 In others, alternate expressions of
anger are more relevant because the good is su±ciently essential to consumers that » is not
large enough to lead to a cessation of purchases. The extent to which the costs borne by
¯rms in these cases resemble those that °ow from the cessation of purchases will need to be
studied in further research.
I suppose that consumer i's material payo® is V (Ui(qi)+Ii¡piqi), where pi and qi are the
price paid and the quantity purchased by i respectively while Ii is his income. The functions
Ui and V are increasing and concave. This formulation has the advantage of leading to simple
demand curves while preserving the idea that di®erent consumers di®er in their marginal
7The State of Florida has a statute which imposes penalties on ¯rms that charge \unconscionable" prices
when the Governor declares a state of emergency following a natural disaster. Florida's law speci¯es that
prices are unconscionable if they are \grossly" larger than those that were charged earlier and if this increase
is not justi¯able by a rise in costs. See http:www.800help°a.com~ cspdfsstatute price gouging.pdf.
8Any individual landlord, for example, probably has only a very modest in°uence on the likelihood that
rent control legislation will be passed.
9See \Quick Stop in Waunakee is picketed" Wisconsin State Journal September 13, 2001 for the story
of a consumer who responded to a gas station that raised its prices after the September 11, 2001 attack by
picketing the station and thereby led the station to close.
9utility of income as a result of di®erences in the level of income. In this section, I suppose
that there are two types so that i equals either 1 and 2, and I let Ni denote the number of
consumers of each type. I suppose that these two types are observably di®erent from each
other and cannot resell the product so that the ¯rm can charge them di®erent prices. Thus,
the ¯rm's total sales Q equal N1q1 + N2q2.
Letting C(Q) represent the cost of producing Q units, the ¯rm's material payo®s xf are
a function of its pro¯ts ¼
x




where v is either linear or concave. I suppose consumers are identical with respect to their
altruism ¸c, with respect to the minimal level of altruism ¹ ¸ that they require and with
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where primes denote ¯rst derivatives. In the normal case where the price pi is above marginal
cost C0, the ¯rm has something to gain from an additional sale. An increase in the altruism
of the consumer towards the ¯rm then induces the consumer to reduce U0 by increasing
his purchases and thereby reducing the distortion that is due to the excess of price over
marginal cost. By the same token, if » is large because the ¯rm is deemed to be insu±ciently
altruistic, the consumer reduces his purchases. To simplify the analysis, I suppose that
consumers actually stop buying altogether when they can reject the hypothesis that the
¯rm's altruism equals at least ¹ ¸.
10This simpli¯cation allows me to avoid modelling the important issue of how consumers communicate
their beliefs about the ¯rm's altruism to one another.
10I ignore anger from the ¯rm towards its consumers so that I let the ¯rms maximize11
W
f = v(¼) + ¸
f X
i
NiV (Ui(qi) + Ii ¡ piqi) (4)
where ¸f is the ¯rm's altruism parameter. Supposing that consumers are not angry at the





















where the left hand side is the derivative of pro¯ts with respect to price. Using ²i to denote
group i's demand elasticity, this can be rearranged to yield
pi =
²i(1 ¡ ¸f¸c)
²i(1 ¡ ¸f¸c) + ¸fV 0
i =v0 ¡ 1
C
0 (6)
This reduces to the familiar formula
²iC0
²i¡1 when the ¯rm is sel¯sh and ¸f = 0. An increase in
¸f lowers the numerator of (5). It also raises the denominator in the plausible if V 0
i =v0 > ¸c
Since we expect the marginal utility of individuals to be no less than that of ¯rms (so that
V 0
i =v0 ¸ 1) and we expect ¸c to be considerably smaller than one, prices decline when ¯rm
altruism rises. This makes intuitive sense since it implies that a more altruistic ¯rm charges
lower prices because this increases the happiness of its customers. If ¸f > 0, prices also
fall when V 0
i =v0 increases. An altruistic ¯rm is more inclined to cut prices if its customers
have a higher marginal utility of wealth relative to the ¯rm's own marginal utility of pro¯ts
because this implies that the ¯rm obtains more indirect utility when the consumer's budget
constraint is relaxed by the price reduction.
Because price is falling in ¸f, consumers can use the prices charged by the ¯rm as an
indicator of ¯rm altruism. In particular, the requirement that a ¯rm have a minimal level of
altruism translates into the requirement that the ¯rm's price not be larger than a threshold
price. Consider in particular the prices ¹ pi that satisfy (6) when ¸f is replaced by ¹ ¸. These
are the largest prices that are consistent with ¹ ¸ since ¯rms would only charge higher prices if
11In a one-period setting it would be hard to incorporate ¯rm anger since ¯rms set their price ¯rst and
consumers purchase afterwards. There is thus nothing for the ¯rm to react to. In a multi-period setting,
angry reactions by the ¯rms are easier to imagine, though I ignore them for simplicity.
11they had lower levels of altruism. Thus, ¯rms that charged higher prices would be punished
by consumers.
The prices ¹ pi exceed marginal cost C0 as long as ¹ ¸fV 0
i =v0 < 1. Firms thus cover their
marginal cost at these prices if the required level of altruism is such that ¯rms prefer a dollar
in their pocket to a dollar in the pocket of their consumers. The observation that ¯rms are
not required to make cash transfers to their consumers suggests that, indeed, the required
level of altruism is lower. What distinguishes a low price from a direct transfer is that the
former costs the ¯rm less. The reason for this is that a price reduction raises sales so that,
when price exceeds marginal cost, price reductions reduce pro¯ts by less than they reduce
the payments of consumers on the units that they were already purchasing.
If marginal cost decreases su±ciently little with the quantity produced, and particularly
if it is nondecreasing, the ¯rm covers all its cost at ¹ pi. There is then an equilibrium where all
¯rms whose altruism is lower than or equal to ¹ ¸ charge these prices. Firms whose altruism
parameter is lower than ¹ ¸ would prefer higher prices but are kept in check by customer's
refusal to buy at prices above ¹ pi. Firms whose ¸f > ¹ ¸, by contrast, simply charge the price
given by (6) using their own ¸f.
I now consider this equilibrium. If the two groups of consumers have the same ²i, the
group whose income I is lower so that its resulting V 0 is higher pays a lower price. The
model thus rationalizes the existence of lower prices for groups that are generally seen as
poorer, such as students and the elderly. This equilibrium also features higher prices for
groups that have a lower elasticity of demand, just as in the conventional analysis with
sel¯sh ¯rms. However, the requirement that the ¯rm act altruistically mutes the e®ect of






²2(1 ¡ ¹ ¸¸c) + ¹ ¸V 0
2=v0 ¡ 1
²1(1 ¡ ¹ ¸¸c) + ¹ ¸V 0
1=v0 ¡ 1
The derivative of this expression with respect to ¹ ¸ is
²1[V 0
2(²1 ¡ 1) ¡ V1(²2 ¡ 1)]
²2[²1(1 ¡ ¹ ¸¸c) + ¹ ¸V 0
1=v0 ¡ 1]2
12Suppose that price di®erences are due exclusively to di®erences in the elasticity of demand
so that V 0
1 = V 0
2, and that, without loss of generality, ²1 < ²2 so that the ¯rm wishes to charge
a higher price to group 1. Then this expression is negative, meaning that a higher ¹ ¸ shrinks
the ratio of the two prices towards one. Some intuition for this result can be gained by
noting that ¯rms are required to charge a price equal to marginal cost if ¹ ¸V 0=v0 is equal to
one. It is thus not surprising that increases in ¹ ¸ make the two prices converge towards one
another.
This result can to some extent rationalize the anger expressed by consumers when they
concluded that Amazon.com was tailoring its prices to individuals by using its information
about these individuals' past purchases.12 If setting up a price discrimination mechanism of
this type has a ¯xed cost, then this price discrimination will not be pro¯table for altruistic
¯rms (who do not get to vary their prices by all that much) whereas it will be pro¯table
for sel¯sh ones. Thus evidence that a ¯rm has set up such a system could be used to infer
that it is insu±ciently altruistic. Amazon, for its part, denied any intention to discriminate
among customers who di®er in their purchase pattern, and gave refunds to those who had
paid more.
Complaints are much more muted against the airline industry's practice of charging
di®erent prices depending on the whether separate °ight segments are bought at the same
time and whether the segments are separated by a Saturday night, even though this also
makes prices for individual items depend on other the items bought by the same customer.
One possible reason for this di®erence in customer reaction is that many discounts do go
to individuals who are arguably less rich. Insofar as leisure travellers are seen as having a
higher V 0 than business travellers, charging less to leisure travellers is consistent with an
equilibrium such as the one where ¯rms charge ¹ p.
A similar type of price discrimination is common in electronic goods, where products
with better features are often sold at substantially higher prices even though their costs of
12See \On the Web, Price Tags Blur; What You Pay Could Depend on Who You Are," Washington Post,
September 27, 2000.
13production are not much greater. Indeed, as discussed by Deneckere and McAfee (1996),
the cost of producing the less e®ective product is often either the same or slightly higher
because the less e®ective product is an intentionally damaged version of the more e®ective
one. It is worth studying whether, empirically, buyers of the more e®ective products tend
to be richer, as would be required for my theory to explain these price di®erences. Insofar
as more e®ective products require less time to perform similar functions, one would expect
this to be the case, since people who earn higher wages ought to place a higher opportunity
cost on their time.
While the equilibrium where ¯rms charge ¹ p has many attractive features, it is generally
not the only equilibrium of the model even if all consumers agree on ¹ ¸. To see this consider
a strictly lower set of prices ~ pi such that the ¯rm continues to break even. Suppose that
consumers believe that ¯rms with an altruism parameter equal to ¹ ¸ charge these prices and
only less altruistic ¯rms charge higher ones. Firms, even those whose altruism is below ¹ ¸
will then charge ~ pi because they know that they would lose all their sales if they charged
more. There is then no reason for consumers not to suspect that any ¯rm that does charge
more is indeed more sel¯sh, so that punishing ¯rms that charge more is consistent with their
utility function (2).
An unappealing feature of these equilibria with lower prices is that they depend on con-
sumer reactions that seem unreasonable. Actions that an altruistic ¯rm would take in the
absence of fears of punishment ought to be su±cient as indicators of genuine altruism, partic-
ularly in a setting where it is straightforward for all players to know what an unconstrained
altruist would do. A slightly di®erent way of criticizing these equilibria is to note that they
depend heavily on each ¯rm's willingness to do exactly what it expects other ¯rms to do so
that it can escape being seen as sel¯sh. In a model where there is incomplete information so
that ¯rms are unsure what will trigger punishment, one would expect such equilibria to be
less plausible than equilibria where each ¯rm's actions are at least somewhat responsive to its
own circumstances. Because the resulting signaling considerations complicate the analysis,
this paper focuses only on actions the ¯rm would take if it had an altruism parameter equal
14to the minimum altruism demanded by consumers.
2 Changes in Factor Costs and in Planned Demand
I now consider how a ¯rm that acts as if it had an altruism parameter of ¹ ¸ responds to the
factors that a®ect marginal cost. For simplicity, I set ¸c = 0 from now on and use ¸ to
denote the ¯rm's altruism. In this section, I focus on changes that are known in advance
of the time the ¯rm sets price and hires the factors that are needed to produce Q. This
means that the ¯rm can set this quantity in such a way that demand at the price chosen
by the ¯rm is equal to Q. For simplicity, I suppose that there is only one type of consumer
so that N consumers each buy the quantity q at the price p. I simplify the analysis further
by supposing that the elasticity of demand ² of these customers is constant and by setting
¸c = 0, though consumers still insist that ¯rms act as if their altruism parameter is at least
equal to ¹ ¸.
As before, I imagine that marginal cost depends on Q. In addition, I let C depend on a
parameter Ã that captures the e®ect of factor costs. Thus, using (6) and remembering that
U0 = p because consumers are sel¯sh when they are not upset at the ¯rm, the price of a ¯rm
that acts as if its altruism parameter were ¸ is
p =
²
² + ¸V 0=v0 ¡ 1
C1(N1q1;Ã) (7)
where C1 represents the derivative of V with respect to its ¯rst argument and is thus equal
to marginal cost.
The two shocks I consider in this section are a change in the number of customers N,
which is a type of change in demand, and a change in Ã, which can be interpreted as a
change in factor cost. Because I am focusing on a single ¯rm, one can view the change in
the number of customers as a change in the relative demand for di®erent products, with a
¯rm's gain in customers matching other ¯rms' decline. Because I suppose that both C2 and
C12 are positive, changes in Ã are best thought of as changes in the ¯rm's factor markets.
It is then straightforward to establish three results.
15Proposition 1: i) If v00 = 0, the percentile response of prices to changes in Ã and N is
independent of the altruism parameter ¸.
ii) If v00 < 0 and C11 > 0, increases in N raise prices by strictly less if ¸ > 0 than if ¸ = 0.
iii) If v00 < 0 and C11 > 0, a given increase in marginal cost C1 leads to a smaller increase in
price if this increase is due to a change in N than if it is due to an increase in Ã.
Proof Changes in N and Ã generally induce changes in q, but do so only through the change
in demand induced by the change in p. Thus, the percent change in q equals ² times the

























If v00 were zero, so that v0 is locally constant, the percent changes in price would obey the
same equation as if the ¯rm acted sel¯shly (though the level of the price would be di®erent)
and this establishes i) . If, by contrast, v were concave, the last term indicates that increases
in pro¯ts would tend to lower the price when the ¯rm acts altruistically. The reason is that,
for a given ¸, increases in pro¯ts make the marginal utility of customer income loom larger
relative to the marginal utility of ¯rm income.
Pro¯ts are given by pQ ¡ C(Q;Ã) so that









Since q varies only because of the change in p, one can use (5) to obtain
d¼ = (p1 ¡ C1)qdN1 ¡ C2dÃ +
¸V 0Q
v0 dp (9)
If the ¯rm acts sel¯shly, the last term is zero. Because an altruistic-acting ¯rm lowers its
price below the sel¯sh optimum, it acts in a region where its pro¯ts increase with its price.
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² ¡ 1 + ¸V 0=v0
v00C2
v0
These equations allow one to see some of the e®ects of varying the parameter ¸. As long
as v00 < 0, an increase in ¸ raises Ap and AÃ while reducing AN. AÃ rises with ¸ because
an increase in Ã directly lowers pro¯ts so that v0 rises and the ¯rm is more inclined to raise
its price. The same logic explains why Ap rises with ¸. Increases in price raise the pro¯ts of
a ¯rm that acts altruistically and thereby lower v0 together with the desirability of raising
prices. Similarly, AN falls with ¸ because increases in N raise pro¯ts. The e®ects on Ap and
AN, together, imply that price unambiguously rises less with N when ¸ > 0 than when the
¯rm acts sel¯shly and this establishes ii).
I now demonstrate iii). This result is trivial when AN < 0 since, in this case, an increase
in marginal cost due to an increase in N actually leads to a price reduction. To prove the
result for AN > 0 in a straightforward manner, it is actually easier to consider the reverse
problem and imagine changes in N and Ã that lead to the same price change. This means








































respectively. Because I start with a case where the two price changes are the same, the terms
in curly brackets are identical. Using (11), the di®erence between the increase in marginal
cost due to dN and that due to dÃ is thus
qC11dN ¡ C12dÃ = ¡
¸V 0=v0
² ¡ 1 + ¸V 0=v0
v00
v0 [q(P ¡ C1)dN + C2dÃ] (12)
In the case of a price increase, C2dÃ must be positive, and the same must be true for
dN if AN > 0. The expression in (12) is then positive and increasing in ¸, if and only
if ¸ > 0. Firm altruism thus implies that a given price increase must be associated with
17a larger increase in marginal cost when it is a response to an increase in the number of
customers than when it is a response to an increase in factor costs. The reason, once again,
is that pro¯ts tend to rise more in the former case, and such pro¯t increases ought to lead
altruistic ¯rms to moderate their prices.
The reason that factor prices have a larger e®ect on the prices is that ¯rm pro¯ts fall
when factor prices increase. This suggests that prices should be less a®ected by changes in
opportunity costs that do not have an e®ect on actual costs. Indeed, a ¯rm that has positive
inventories of an input whose price goes up experiences, if anything, a rise in pro¯ts rather
than a fall and it would thus be less acceptable if it increased its price. Vaidyanathan and
Aggarwal (2003) provide questionnaire evidence that people do indeed perceive such price
increases as less fair than price increases that are triggered by increases in costs that ¯rms
must actually pay.
The result that prices respond more to factor prices than to increases in demand that
increase marginal cost by the same amount ¯ts with evidence presented in Bils and Chang
(2000) as well as with several earlier studies which they discuss. It is not clear that this
result has, by itself, implications for the way that prices respond in general equilibrium to
changes in aggregate demand as opposed to changes in factor costs. As stressed for example
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1991), there are important conceptual di®erences between
changes in a ¯rm's individual demand and changes in aggregate demand (or in the demand
for the typical ¯rm).
In particular, it is di±cult to extend the result concerning the number of customers to
an aggregate setting. In such a setting an increase in the average number of customers also
requires an increase in the number of people earning income, for otherwise the new customers
would have no resources to spend, and this would also a®ect factor markets. More generally,
the aggregate income that individuals have available for spending at any given moment is
closely related to the income they earn from producing, so that it is di±cult for people to
spend more (as is required by an increase in aggregate demand) without there also being an
increase in the total quantity of production. This, however, begs the question of how and
18why output increases in the ¯rst place.
One way that this could occur is if ¯rms increased their demand for labor. Workers would
then have more income to spend and demand for the typical ¯rm would increase. In many
models, increases in the demand for labor are motivated by increases in labor productivity.
In my notation, this would entail changes in Ã, however. The demand for labor would
also rise if ¯rms reduced their markup of price relative to marginal cost, since this would
lead ¯rms to hire additional workers even though this would increase their marginal cost of
production. One simple mechanism that induces this behavior is price rigidity in the face of
increases in nominal marginal cost.
Like standard models without explicit costs of changing prices, the model in this section
cannot rationalize this behavior. However, altruistic behavior by ¯rms towards consumers
expands the range of reasons for price rigidity. In particular, it implies that any costs that
consumers pay when prices are changed must be taken into account by ¯rms. I show this in
the next section, where I focus on an extreme form of price rigidity that seems di±cult to
rationalize with purely administrative costs of changing prices.
3 The Fairness of Raising Prices when Demand Rises
Suddenly
In this section I consider a continuum of consumers who di®er in their valuation for a single
unit of the good at a point in time. The good was previously available at price p0 and I
introduce a psychological cost to consumers when this price changes. In particular, I suppose
that positive departures of the current price p from p0 induces a regret cost of `(p¡p0) where
`(0) = 0 and `(x) > 0 if x > 0.
I suppose that the only well functioning market for purchasing the good is at a store that
posts a price p. There is no resale market so that, if the store runs out, consumers who are
turned away from the store cannot obtain it at any price. Such consumers incur the regret
cost ¹ `.13 The absence of a resale market also means that there is no mechanism that ensures
13The complete absence of a resale market is obviously an extreme case. An empirically more appealing
19that the limited quantities of the good that are sold at p go to the customers that value it
most highly. Rather, I suppose that purchasers are randomly drawn from the population
that is willing to pay p for the good.
I let the material payo®s of each potential consumer be given by
V ((Á + a ¡ p)x + I) ¡ w0`(p ¡ p0) ¡ w1¹ ` (13)
In this equation, x equals 1 if the person buys the good and 0 otherwise, Á is a parameter
shifting the demand for all individuals and a is distributed across individuals with pdf F(a)
and support [aL;aH]. The variable w0 equals 1 if a > p0 ¡ Á so that the individual would
have bought the good if its price continued to equal p0, and equals 0 otherwise. Lastly, the
variable w1 equals 1 x = 0 even though a > p¡Á so that the individual would buy the good
if it were actually available at p. With N representing the total number of consumers, the
number of consumers willing to buy the good at price p is N(1 ¡ F(p ¡ Á)).
Now consider a ¯rm that has produced Q units in advance, and which cannot increase
its sales volume beyond Q in the short run. Since I am focusing on situations where demand
has increased abruptly, I suppose that demand at price p0, N(1 ¡ F(p0 ¡ Á)) is larger than
Q. I show that, nonetheless, a ¯rm that acts as if it had an altruism parameter of ¸ might
decide to keep its price constant. One obvious alternative to keeping the price constant is
to charge the market clearing price p¤, which satis¯es
N(1 ¡ F(p
¤ ¡ Á)) = Q:
Even if the ¯rm chooses not to charge the market clearing price, one might expect it to
prefer a slight price increase to a strictly constant price. Moreover, small price changes are
case would have a limited resale market. One might suppose, for example, that while a fraction g of potential
customers is unable to get the good at price p, a fraction f of these can buy them from the fraction 1 ¡ g
non-rationed consumers. One might further speculate that the fraction f that obtains the good pays a
market clearing price that exceeds the price that would clear the overall market. This would capture the
idea that intermediaries exist that are able to funnel some items from people who bought them at p to people
who are willing to pay considerably more. Popular toys, for example, often appear on Ebay at prices far in
excess of suggested retail prices though producers try to foil these resellers by making only limited quantities
available to any one customer. In other settings, such as snow shovels during snow storms, it seems more
accurate to consider the limiting case where f is zero.
20quite common so it may seem peculiar that they are not acceptable when demand increases
a great deal. Nonetheless, Maxwell's (1995) respondents felt that responding to a blizzard
by raising the price of snow shovels by a small amount was unfair - though less unfair than
increasing these prices a great deal. The conditions under which the ¯rm prefers p0 to a




p¡Á[V (Á + a ¡ p + I)dF(a) ¡ V (I)
1 ¡ F(p ¡ Á)
The ¯rm prefers p0 to a price slightly above p0 if either the function ` is nondi®erentiable
at zero with limx!0 > 0 or if
Q0`
0(0) > N¹ `F
0(p ¡ Á) + ¸NF
0(p ¡ Á)(~ U ¡ V (I)) + (v
0 ¡ ¸V
0)Q (14)
where `0(0) is the derivative of `(x) at x = 0 and Q0 = N(1 ¡ F(p0 ¡ Á)).
Proof Suppose that the ¯rm charges p < p¤. Those individuals for whom a < p ¡ Á do not
wish to buy at p so that, leaving aside their regret, their material payo®s equal V (I). The
probability that someone with a higher a obtains the good is Q(1¡F(p¡Á)=N. If a person
with such a valuation obtains the good, his material payo®s are given by (13) with w1 = 0,
otherwise, they equal V (I) ¡ `(p ¡ p0) ¡ ¹ `. Taking expectations over realizations of a, an
individual's expected material payo®s are thus
¹ U = V (I) +
Q
N
~ U ¡ Q0`(p ¡ p0)) ¡
µ






Recalling that sales stay ¯xed because the price is below the level that ensures that only
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R aH
p¡Á V 0(Á + a ¡ p + I)dF(a)





0(p ¡ p0) (15)
This expression shows that consumers experience two bene¯ts and two costs from an increase
in price. The ¯rst term is the bene¯t from the reduction in the regret that is due to rationing.
The density of people that stop being rationed, which is the same as that of the people who
stop buying voluntarily, is given by F 0(p ¡ Á). The second term captures the bene¯t of
21allocating the good to individuals who value it more. A price increase ensures that some
buyers who were just indi®erent between buying and not buying the good, are replaced by
buyers whose average valuation is ~ U, which is positive. The density of such replacements is
F 0(p ¡ Á) as well. The third term captures the income reduction due to the price increase
while the last is the loss from the increase in regret at having to pay a higher price.
Since Q is ¯xed, the material payo®s to the ¯rm from selling Q units at price p are pQ.






Suppose for simplicity that all consumers have the same V 0, which could depend on Á since
devastating weather changes presumably raise the marginal utility of income. This expression
then reduces to
N¸¹ `F
0(p ¡ Á) + ¸Q
F 0(p ¡ Á)(~ U ¡ V (I))
1 ¡ F(p ¡ Á)
¡ ¸Q0`
0(p ¡ p0) + (v
0 ¡ ¸V
0)Q
The ¯rst two terms on the RHS of (14) are clearly positive and capture the allocational
bene¯ts of raising p. One would normally expect the last term to be positive as well since
¯rms should not typically be expected to have a level of altruism so large that they prefer a
dollar in their customers' pocket to a dollar in their own. Thus, under normal circumstances,
(v0 ¡ ¸V 0) is positive. However, these terms could be negative in the aftermath of a natural
disaster, when consumers feel impoverished so that their V 0's are high relative to v0. This is
particularly the case for ¯rms supplying goods that are needed in these circumstances, since
one can expect these ¯rm's sales volume to rise so that their v0 falls.
Still, `0 > 0, or a jump in ` at 0, make it considerably easier to justify holding prices
constant rather than raising them slightly. This raises the question of whether having the
function ` jump at zero, or even increase substantially, is reasonable. One reason why
consumers may be averse even to small price changes is that price changes - no matter the size
- require processing e®ort by consumers that can be avoided if prices remain unchanged. This
22can be rationalized by supposing that, for many consumers, the e®ort needed to remember
the price paid in the past is larger than the e®ort needed to recognize this price when it
is presented to them again. A consumer who fails to recognize the price that is presented
to him must then go through a discrete additional e®ort to determine whether the price is
reasonable. One bit of evidence that supports some elements of this logic is provided by
Monroe and Lee (1999). They show that the fraction of consumers that correctly recalled a
price that they saw before was signi¯cantly smaller than the fraction that could recognize
the correct price from a list.14
Whether (14) is satis¯ed or depends not only on `0 and v0=V 0 but also on F 0. If F 0 is low,
the inequality can be satis¯ed even if `0 is modest. Moreover, it is easy to imagine that F 0
would indeed be low in the neighborhood of p0 after a massive increase in demand. Right
after a blizzard, demand is presumably not a®ected a great deal by a 10% increase in the
price of snow shovels. Only after the price rises considerably more can one expect demand to
fall to the point where only q is demanded. By contrast, a more modest increase in demand,
seems more likely to lead to a more substantial F 0 at p0.
So far I have only considered small price increases. Even in F 0 is modest near p0 after
a massive demand increase, it is presumably more substantial when price increases more.
The problem is that, by the time the price has a substantial e®ect on demand, its increase
may be so substantial that it generates a great deal of regret. A ¯rm that acts altruistically
would then refrain from large price increases as well. It would then be possible for prices
to be more rigid when demand rises a great deal than when it rises more modestly. I now
construct an example where, indeed, price is more likely to be constant after a big shock to
demand than after a smaller one.
Suppose that F is uniform between aL and aH. With this distribution of consumer
valuations, all N consumers wish to buy if p is below (Á+aL), while the quantity demanded
14Because lists have fewer elements than the possible number of prices that might be recalled, the number
of errors would be somewhat smaller when consumers are presented a list that includes the correct price even
if consumers pick their answer randomly. It is notable, however, that consumers also make fewer mistakes
when asked to recognize a price from a list than they do when asked to remember the ranking of prices from
di®erent brands.
23equals N(Á + aH ¡ p)=(aH ¡ aL) for prices above this level. Thus, if Q < N, the market
clearing price is Á+ah¡(ah¡aL)Q=N. If ¯rms charge this market clearing price, consumer
welfare is
V (I)(N ¡ Q) ¡ Q0`(p ¡ p0) + N
Z aH
aH¡(aH¡aL)Q=N
V (I + a ¡ aH + (aH ¡ aL)Q=N)
aH ¡ aL
da (16)
For prices below this level, either all N or
N(Á+aH¡p)
aH¡aL ¡ Q consumers are rationed. This
means that the probability that a consumer who wants to purchase the good at price p
actually obtains it is
R ´
Q(aH ¡ aL)=N
aH ¡ max(aL;p ¡ Á)
Total consumer welfare is then
V (I)(N¡Q)¡Q0`(p¡p0)¡N





V (Á + a ¡ p + I)
aH ¡ aL
da
Assuming that V 0 is constant and setting V (I) = 0 for simplicity, total consumer welfare
when the price clears the market is
Q
2V
0(ah ¡ aL)=2N ¡ Q0`(p ¡ p0) (17)
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¹ ` for p ¸ Á + aL (19)
The ¯rst of these expressions declines in price more rapidly than the second. The reason
is that, when all consumers are rationed because p < (Á + aL), price increases do not
(locally) improve the allocation of resources and therefore also fail to reduce the regret costs
of rationing. For higher prices, increases in prices hurt consumers less. In the case where
consumer income has not been massively disrupted so that we would expect (v0 ¡¸V 0) > 0,















24since ¹ ` should be substantial relative to `0. This means that a ¯rm with altruism parameter
equal to ¸ prefers local increases in prices once prices start having an e®ect on consumption.
This condition ensures that, such an altruistic ¯rm prefers the market clearing price to any
price between (Á + aL) and the market clearing price.
The question of whether it prefers either p0 or the market clearing price to charging prices
that are strictly between p0 and (Á + aL) is more complex. One su±cient, though by no







0(p ¡ p0)) < 0 for p0 < p < Á + aL (20)
This condition implies that the ¯rm prefers charging p0 to any price between p0 and Á+aL on
the grounds that price increases in this range cause too much disappointment for consumers.
If both of these conditions hold, the ¯rm e®ectively faces the choice between charging
p0 and charging the market clearing price. To see which is better, suppose without loss of
generality that p0 is the market clearing price for the level of demand Á0 and that Q0 = Q.
If, when the level of demand switches to Á, the ¯rm charges the new market clearing price,
its pro¯ts are (Á ¡ Á0)Q larger than if it continues to charge p0. Consumer welfare with the
new market clearing price is given by (17) with (p ¡ p0) replaced by (Á ¡ Á0). If the ¯rm
sticks to p0 and Á ¡ Á0 > (aH ¡ aL)(1 ¡ Q=N), p0 is below Á + aL so that consumer welfare
is given by (18) with p replaced by p0. If, instead, Á ¡ Á0 > (aH ¡ aL)(1 ¡ Q=N), consumer
welfare with p0 is given by (19) with p replaced by p0.
This means that, for Á ¡ Á0 > (aH ¡ aL)(1 ¡ Q=N) the loss to consumers from going to
the new market clearing price is
Q`(Á ¡ Á0) + qV
0
"




¡ (N ¡ Q)¹ `
whereas this loss equals
Q`(Á ¡ Á0) + QV




when Á ¡ Á0 < (aH ¡ aL)(1 ¡ Q=N).
25To gain some insights into the determinants of whether a ¯rm acting as if it had an
altruism parameter of ¸ would switch over to the new market clearing price, Figures 1 and
2 show consumer losses and pro¯t gains from such a change. Pro¯t gains are de°ated by
¸ because the ¯rm is supposed to change its price when its pro¯ts from doing so exceed ¹ ¸
times the losses to consumers. The ¯gures are drawn for V 0;v0;aH;aL;N and Q equal to 2,
1, 10, 5, 10 and 8 respectively. Both ¯gures include values of ¹ ¸ of both .35 and .45. Using
a V 0 that is larger than one raises the weight put on consumer losses relative to producer
gains for any given ¸. The use of a high V 0=v0 seems particularly appropriate when a major
disaster has struck that makes consumers feel impoverished. It is less attractive, however,
in the case of demand changes that are not accompanied by changes in the marginal utility
of wealth.
Figure 1 considers the case where ¹ ` = 16 while the disappointment losses from high prices
are given by `(x) = min(16;2x). The Figure shows that an altruistic ¯rm would raise its
price to the market clearing level if Á was not substantially larger than Á0. Given that (20) is
satis¯ed for this example, it would otherwise prefer to keep its price constant. It is important
to see that this result hinges both on substantial altruism and substantial disappointment
costs. Consumer disappointment costs without ¯rm altruism lead the ¯rm to always raise
its price, since this increases pro¯ts. Similarly, with pure altruism and no disappointment
costs, the ¯rm would always change its price except in when consumers experience so much
hardship that the ¯rm is supposed to care more about a dollar in the consumer's pocket
than a dollar in its own.15
One interesting conclusion of this Figure is that increases in altruism imply that the
¯rm stops changing its price even for lower values of Á. This means that, while ¯rms with
either altruism parameter refrain from ever instituting large price increases (in response
to large shifts in Á), more altruistic ¯rms also refrain from smaller price increases. This
15One might think that even in this extreme case, the ¯rm would prefer to charge the market clearing
price and transfer resources to consumers in other ways. If, however, alternate methods for transferring
resources also yield distortions, as they are likely to, transferring resources via a low price may be the ¯rm's
best method for accomplishing the transfer.
26provides a possible rationalization for Maxwell's (1999) ¯nding that respondents found large
price increases more unfair (which I would interpret as being associated with lower altruism
parameters) than smaller ones.
Because the disappointment costs of very small price increases are assumed to be trivial
in the derivation of Figure 1, very small increases in Á do lead to price changes. An obvious
alternative is to suppose that, in addition, there is a discrete increase in disappointment if
the price is at all di®erent from what it was in the past. This is considered in Figure 2, which
is drawn under the assumption that ¹ ` = 18 while `(x) = min(18;2(1 + x)). The obvious
e®ect of adding these ¯xed disappointment costs is that ¯rms no longer make small price
changes so that the price remains constant when Á di®ers only slightly from Á0. The price
changes that do occur, take place for intermediate levels of demand.
When demand suddenly increases, this model rationalizes consumer anger at price in-
creases, and thus some rigidity in prices, both when consumer's marginal utility of income
becomes very elevated and when consumers could have bought the good previously so that
they are disappointed to have to pay a higher price. It should be noted, however, that
consumers could also be disappointed if they had previously bought a complementary good
to the one whose price suddenly increases. The model may thus be able to explain the
fascinating case of gasoline rationing in California in 1920 that is discussed in Olmstead and
Rhode (1985). In the period leading up to this rationing, tractor and automobile ownership
expanded dramatically. There were 620,000 cars on the road at the end of 1918 and 906,000
at the end of 1920. The amount of gasoline sold did not keep pace with this increase in
demand and the monopoly seller of gasoline, SOCal, held the line on prices while helping to
institute a complicated rationing scheme. One interpretation of these actions that is con-
sistent with my model is that many consumers might have been upset if their new vehicles
suddenly became expensive to operate. One interesting aspect of this episode is that it is
manifestly inconsistent with the idea that sellers whose customers have search costs keep
prices constant because they are afraid that price increases will lead customers to search for
27alternative suppliers.16 SOCal had no competitors to worry about and, indeed, prices appear
to have been less rigid in more competitive gasoline markets.
A further implication of the theory is that there are circumstances where increases in
demand ought not to translate more readily into price increases because there is less reason
to expect anger at such increases. They both involve services, which are often harder to
\store" than goods. Thus, purchasing a service before a price increase frequently fails to
provide a similar utility °ow as purchasing it afterwards. This means that the scope for
regret after a price increase is reduced. One example of this is the provision of hotel services
in cities that receive a large in°ux of visitors during a special event. In practice, hotels often
raise their rates substantially for events such as the Cannes ¯lm festival or the Frankfurt
book fair.17
A second example is the provision of repair services after changes in weather causes
damages to physical property. Any impact of this damage on the marginal utility of income
would have a similar e®ect on the acceptability of raising prices for these services as on the
acceptability of raising prices for goods. The prices of the latter, however, should also be
restrained by the empathy ¯rms are supposed to feel for those who feel they could have
bought the goods earlier. Thus, evidence on the way that di®erent prices evolve after storms
ought to help disentangle the importance of the regret channel that I have emphasized in
my analysis.
4 Putting items \on special"
As discussed above, one reason to consider a model in which customers want their suppliers
to be altruistic is that it can rationalize price rigidity in some circumstances. In other
circumstances, it turns out, ¯rm altruism can rationalize its opposite, namely price variations
16See Haddock and McChesney (1994) for an explanation of rigid prices along these lines. Stiglitz (1987),
however, shows that this search-theoretic logic actually leads to multiple equilibria rather than to unique
equilibria with rigid prices. The reason is that the belief by customers that other producers have changed
their price then leads each producer to change its own, thereby rationalizing the consumers' beliefs.
17See, The big squeeze - Unfair fairs, The Economist, October, 18 2003.
28in the absence of cost of changes. In this section I focus in particular on the ability of the
model to explain why certain goods price alternate between being on special and being sold
at \regular" prices. One fascinating aspect of this practice is that prices often return to
exactly their pre-special value when the special ends. In other words, \regular" prices are
quite rigid even though the price seems \°exible" in the sense that specials lead it to change
relatively frequently.
The observation that the regular price returns to its previous value seems inconsistent
with models such as Pesendorfer (2002) and the literature that precedes him, which base
temporary sales only on variations in demand elasticity. The problem for these models is
that the opportunity costs for inputs °uctuate constantly and these °uctuations in input
costs ought to lead ¯rms to charge di®erent prices after specials end than before they begin.
The basic characteristics of specials also raise two questions for the type of model I con-
sider here. The most general one is why price alternations between \regular" and \special"
prices should be regarded as di®erent from changes in regular prices. The more speci¯c one
is why customers would ¯nd it acceptable to have prices vary when items are put on special
but feel betrayed when regular prices change. One key di®erence between the two is that
disappointment at facing a higher price than was available previously is likely to be much
lower when a customer buys after the special is over. The reason is that customers who
observe the higher price after the special is over fall into two categories: those that observed
that the item was on special previously and those that did not. For those that did not, the
return to the regular price is not seen as a price increase at all, so they have little reason
to be disappointed. Now consider those that did observe the special price. If they were
interested in buying the good, most of these presumably did so at the time since they knew
that the special price would end. By doing so, they avoid paying the higher price and the
attendant disappointment. Thus, the disappointed group, which consists of customers who
saw that the item was on special and nonetheless deferred buying until the price rose again,
ought to be relatively small.
It might be argued that even those customers who did not see the item on special are
29somewhat disappointed whenever they pay the regular price for an item that is known to
be on special some of the time. The reason is that, while they do not know when they
should have shopped for the item, they know that doing so at an earlier date might well
have been advantageous. While I do not consider this cost explicitly, its existence implies
that a ¯rm that uses specials must be avoiding the ostracism of its customers through some
other method of proving its altruism. In the setting I consider, what is altruistic about the
¯rm is that it makes the good available, at least sometimes, at prices so low that the ¯rm
would become bankrupt if it charged these prices at all times. In e®ect, specials can be a
particularly e®ective mechanism for lowering prices to customers, and we have already seen
that altruistic ¯rms tend to have lower prices.
The model I use has many of the elements in Pesendorfer (2002), who in turn builds
on an extensive prior literature that he cites. Like much of this literature, I suppose that
there are two types of customers, and that these di®er in their valuation !i of the goods.
Unlike Pesendorfer (2002), I let the number of individuals with valuation !i be constant
over time and equal to Ni. This ensures that the elasticity of demand is constant over time.
It thus eliminates the source of \specials" in his model, which is based on the idea that
high valuation consumers exit the market after purchasing goods at high prices and thereby
raise the elasticity of demand in the next period (because the market then includes a higher
fraction of low-valuation consumers).18
In period t, the ¯rm charges a price pt and sells quantity Qt. Thus, variable pro¯ts in
each period are (pt ¡ c)Qt. Because specials last a short time, so that it should be easy for
the ¯rm to borrow and lend across periods, it does not seem appropriate to treat the ¯rm
as having a concave objective function over each period's pro¯ts. It is more appealing to
suppose, instead that the ¯rm's decision makers have a utility function that is concave in
18Pesendorfer (2002) presents evidence that the number of units sold at low prices is lower if prices in the
previous week were low. This contradicts my model, if it is taken literally so that it requires that demand be
independent of what has taken place in the past. However, what I seek to establish is only that temporary
sales will be regarded as fair, and will thus be instituted by a ¯rm that seeks to look altruistic, even if the
elasticity of demand is constant. The right sort of variation in the elasticity of demand will further encourage
specials, particularly if consumers are willing to see such variations as demonstrating altruism.
30the average level of ¯rm pro¯ts. This can be rationalized by supposing that managers are
averse to having the ¯rm dissolved and know that consistent losses lead creditors to demand
such an action. By contrast, the extra bene¯t from having more than is necessary to meet
these creditor obligations might be lower. I thus suppose that the ¯rm's material payo®s are
given by
v(E((p ¡ c)Q)
where the expectations operator here takes averages over di®erent points in time and v is
increasing and concave once again. If v is su±ciently concave, and the level of altruism ¸ is
su±ciently high, specials emerge in equilibrium. In particular
Proposition 3: Let © be the fraction of the time that the ¯rm charges !1 and ¢ be given
by
¢ = (!2 ¡ !1)N2 ¡ (!1 ¡ c)N1 (21)








the ¯rm prefers 0 < © < 1 to setting © equal to either zero or one if U00
f is su±ciently low.
Proof: By charging a price !1 a fraction © of the time, the altruistic ¯rm's total payo® is
v
³
(!2 ¡ c)N2 ¡ ©¢
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+ ©N2¸(!2 ¡ !1)





(!2 ¡ c)N2 ¡ ©¢
´
+ ¸N2(!2 ¡ !1) = 0 (23)
Because v is concave, the derivative of the LHS with respect to © is negative. Inequality
(22) ensures that the LHS of this equation is positive for © = 0 so that the ¯rm prefers a




(!2 ¡ c)N2 ¡ ¢
´
+ ¸N2(!2 ¡ !1) < 0
31in spite of (22). This means that the ¯rm prefers a © strictly smaller than one and that the
optimum © is indeed interior and satis¯es (23).
The advantage of charging the high price is that N2 customers pay more while the disad-
vantage is that the ¯rm foregoes the pro¯t !1 ¡ c on the N1 low-valuation customers. My
assumption that ¢ > 0 ensures that a sel¯sh ¯rm would always charge the high price !2. In
each period that the ¯rm charges !2, its customers obtain a surplus of zero. On the other
hand, whenever it charges !1, the high valuation customers gain !2 ¡ !1, which yields the
¯rm ¸(!2 ¡ !1)N2 in additional utility. When the ¯rm's pro¯ts are high, and its marginal
utility of income is low, these indirect bene¯ts from its altruism loom large so that it wants
to lower its price some of the time. If, instead, the ¯rm is always charging low prices then
its marginal utility of income is high, and it wants to reduce the fraction of the time that it
sells also to the low valuation consumers.
Note that specials are much better for a partially altruistic ¯rm than simply handing
money to its customers. When a ¯rm hands over money, its material losses are the same
as the customers material gains. By putting a good on special, the ¯rm loses ¢ but, in the
case where !1 > c, this is less than the gain to the high valuation customers because the
¯rm makes some pro¯ts from the low-valuation ones.
Before closing this section, it is worth noting that the concavity of v is necessary for the
result given the other assumptions in the model. The reasons is that, because I consider a
model with static demand curves, a linear v would imply a constant policy in equilibrium
rather than one where prices alternate. Interestingly, the concavity of v does not induce
alternating prices in the pure pro¯t maximization case since the ¯rms would then pursue
the policy that maximizes pro¯ts each period rather than trading o® pro¯ts in some periods
for the welfare of the consumers with lower willingness to pay. Thus, this is a setting where
altruism alone is responsible for temporary sales.
This raises the question of why altruism can lead to an optimum where the price varies
over time even though one can always ¯nd a single price that maximizes v + ¸V at a single
point in time. One important aspect of the example I presented is that the price that
32maximizes v + ¸V is quite di®erent for high ¸ than it is for a sel¯sh ¯rm because the
elasticity of demand becomes large at a price below the pro¯t maximizing one. The result is
that, for moderate ¸, the ¯rm prefers to alternate between the price that is optimal for high
¸ and the sel¯sh optimum rather than choose a single price that is close to either.
5 Price Rigidity in the Face of Steady In°ation
Having shown that the avoidance of customer regret can explain both the return to the pre-
special price and the absence of price changes when demand changes without a corresponding
change in the quantity supplied, I now turn to a simple setting where the ¯rm must cause
this regret because it must change its prices. The reason it must do so is that its costs
rise constantly so that it would ultimately make huge losses if it kept its price constant.
I suppose in particular that is in an environment of constant in°ation at the rate ¹. The
model I consider mimics closely that of Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) so that it is easy to see
the similarities and di®erences between the administrative costs of changing prices that they
explore and the consumer disappointment costs that I emphasize. I thus suppose that time
is continuous and that, in addition to su®ering a loss `(pt;pt¡) at each date t where the price





where qt represents their rate of consumption of the good in question and zt represents
the consumption of a numeraire good. I consider this numeraire only because it allows me
to isolate what occurs in a single market; a more complete model would treat all goods
symmetrically instead. The price of this numeraire good, pzt grows at the rate ¹, and
consumers have access to an asset with an instantaneous rate of interest of i. Letting A
denote the consumers' assets and _ A their time derivative, it follows that
_ A = iA ¡ ptqt ¡ pztzt + It
where It represents non-asset income. It follows that, unless i = r + ¹ individuals will not
consume z smoothly over time. If this condition is satis¯ed, by contrast, individuals are
33indi®erent as to when they consumes z. Each individual's utility is thus the same as if he
reduced his consumption of zt by one unit every time his consumption of qt rose by pzt=pt
units, since this response ensures that his budget constraint remains satis¯ed. This means












where It is independent of prices. Moreover, each individual's demand for q satis¯es u0(qt) =
pt=pzt. With a mass N of consumers, total demand is given by Qt = d(pt=pzt) with d = Nu
0¡1.
As before, consumers also experience a disappointment loss at t of `(pt;pt¡) if the price is
changed at t from pt¡ ro pt. Crucially, I suppose that the function ` has a positive limit as pt
goes to pt¡ from above, even though `(x;x) = 0. Just as Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) suppose
that there is a ¯xed administrative costs of changing prices, I suppose that there is a ¯xed
psychological cost of observing a price increase. In addition to the psychological reasons given
above, this ¯xed psychological cost might exist because consumers are disappointed whenever
they would have bene¯ted from stockpiling the product just before the price increase took
e®ect.
The instantaneous cost of producing the good is cpzt so that this cost rises at the general
rate of in°ation ¹. This means that instantaneous pro¯ts at t in terms of the numeraire




























¡r^ ti`(p^ ti;p^ ti¡)
where ^ ti represent the dates where the ¯rm changes its prices.
The discreteness of the costs of changing prices ensures that ¯rms do not change their
prices at every instant. To make the problem completely stationary, I suppose that ` depends
on the percent change in the price, which is proportional to (pt ¡pt¡)=pt¡. The stationarity
of the problem then implies that the ¯rm keeps its price unchanged for intervals of length ¿
and that this interval length remains constant over time. Each time it picks a new price, it
34chooses the same real price s = pt=pzt and it does so by changing its price by 100(e¹¿ ¡ 1)
percent. Let the function W(y) be given by d(y)((1 ¡ ¸N)y ¡ c) + ¸NU(d(y)). Then the
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0 = W(s) ¡ W(se
¡¹¿) (27)
In the case where `0 = 0, this equation is identical to the equation in Sheshinski and
Weiss (1977) which states that the di®erence between ¯rm welfare at the reset price and
¯rm welfare at the terminal price equals the interest rate times the cost of price adjustment
(which would be ¸` in the case where `0 = 0). This equation is worth recalling because it
plays a large role in the interpretation of my results concerning pre-announcements of price
increases.
Before discussing this issue, however, I wish to focus on the implications of this model
for the connection between the in°ation rate ¹ and the time between price increases ¿. To




the demand curve d has constant elasticity ². The function W(y) is then ²+¸¡1
²¡1 y1¡² ¡ cy¡²
and the ¯rst order condition (25) implies that
s =
²c




¹(² ¡ 1) ¡ r
¹² ¡ r
(28)
This implies that, for any given ¿ and ¹ the price set by the ¯rm is lower by the factor
²¡1
¸+²¡1 when the ¯rm has an altruism parameter of ¸ than when it is sel¯sh. With these
35preferences, the ¯rst order condition (26) becomes
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Di®erences in the altruism parameter ¸ obviously require di®erent levels ` to justify a
given ¿, with lower levels of altruism necessitating larger disappointment costs if the ¯rm
is to keep its prices constant for the same amount of time. If, however, ` is adjusted to
rationalize a particular ¿ for a given in°ation rate ¹, this equation implies that changes in
in°ation have the same e®ect on ¿ independently of ¸. This can be seen by noting that
the right hand side of this equation is independent of ¹ and ¿, while the left hand side is
independent of ¸ and `.
Thus, when `0 = 0, altruism cannot help rationalize the connection between changes in the
size of price increases and changes in in°ation rates. This is worth emphasizing because the
empirical connection between these magnitudes is not easy to rationalize with the Sheshinski
and Weiss (1977) model. Cecchetti's (1986) data shows that the average price increase for
his sample of magazines rose from 23.5 percent in the 1960's to 25.3 percent in the 1970's
when the average yearly CPI in°ation rose from 2.4 percent to 7.1 percent. Similarly, Lach
and Tsiddon (1992) report that the average price increase for their sample of Israeli goods
rose from 12.3 percent in the period 1978-1979:6 to 12.9 percent in 1982, while the overall
monthly in°ation rate rose from 3.9 percent to 7.3 percent from the ¯rst to the second
period. Thus, in both cases, the average price increase rose only very marginally even as
in°ation rose substantially. This is not completely inconsistent with the idea that there are
36administrative costs of changing prices. If, for example, all consumers have exactly the same
reservation price ¹ p for the product, then ¯rms raise their price to ¹ p whenever they raise their
price, and this implies that the percent price increase is the same regardless of the in°ation
rate.
For more standard demand curves, however, the size of the typical price increase ought
to rise more with in°ation. To see this, it is worth starting with the combination of ¸ and
` which ensures that prices rise by 12.3 percent when the in°ation rate is 3.9 percent per
month, as in the early sample of Lach and Tsiddon (1992). With r = :0025 (so that the real
interest rate is about 3 percent per year), an increase in in°ation to 7.3 percent implies that
prices should rise by about 15.4 percent when they are changed for any constant elasticity of
demand curve whose ² is greater than 1.5 and below 5. For more elastic demand curves, the
price increase should rise somewhat more, but the e®ect of varying ² is modest. Similarly, if
¯xed costs are set so that prices rise by 23.5 percent with a 2.4 percent annual in°ation rate,
as in Cecchetti's (1986) observations for the 1960's, these parameters imply that an increase
in annual in°ation to 7.1 percent ought to raise the size of price increases to over 35 percent.
If the costs of changing prices were purely administrative, there is little reason to suppose
that the real costs of changing prices would rise with the in°ation itself. By contrast, it makes
sense for disappointment costs to rise when the size of price increases rises. This means that
`0 > 0 and I consider the case where ` is given by the simple form
` = `0 + `1(e
¹¿ ¡ 1)
It is then possible to rationalize the ¯ndings of Cecchetti (1986) and Lach and Tsiddon
(1992) with very small values of `1. Suppose in particular that ¸ = :1, ² = 2 and `1 = 0:00035.
The value `0 = :0029 the rationalizes a price change of 12.3 percent when in°ation is 3.9
percent per month. A rise in monthly in°ation to 7.3 percent, then implies that the size of
price increases rises to 12.9 percent as in the data of Lach and Tsiddon (1992). Even though
the size of price increases rises by nearly 5 percent, the disappointment costs rise by less
than 1 percent.
37Similarly, with ¸ = :1, ² = 2 and `1 = :023, a value of `0 equal to .26 is su±cient to
rationalize the rather substantial 23.5 percent increase in magazine prices when the annual
in°ation rate is only 2.4 percent. With these parameters, an increase in annual in°ation to
7.3% correctly predicts that the size of price increases rises only to 25.3%. While the size of
price increases is now rising by 7.7%, the size of disappointment costs goes up only by 1.5%
so that, by this metric, `1 is modest once again.
A positive value for `1 leads an altruistic ¯rm to feel that reductions in the period over
which prices are constant are advantageous to its customers because they reduce the size of
disappointment costs. The usual bene¯t of lengthening this period is that the cost of price
increases is postponed, and has value because the future is discounted at r. As the rate of
in°ation rises postponing a price increase by a given amount of time requires larger jumps
in prices. With a positive `1, postponing price increases by one unit of time thus becomes
less attractive when in°ation rises, and this is the reason why `1 is so useful for rationalizing
the empirical ¯ndings.
An alternative mechanism that might be able to rationalize the ¯nding that the size of
price jumps does not rise signi¯cantly when in°ation rises is that ¯rms are worried about
speculation on the part of consumers. As in the analysis of Benabou (1989), this speculation
becomes more severe when expected price increases are larger and this might limit the extent
to which ¯rms let price jumps increase as in°ation rises. A more straightforward implication
of Benabou's (1989) analysis is that ¯rms that sell storable goods often should use mixed
strategies if they have administrative costs of changing prices. By making the timing of
their price changes random, such ¯rms make it harder for consumers to pro¯t from their
speculation (since consumers who buy and store the good will then sometimes incur storage
costs needlessly).
In an environment with other sources of uncertainty, even a deterministic relation between
prices and costs may make it di±cult for consumers to time their purchases to take advantage
of impending price increases, so purposeful obfuscation may be less necessary to prevent this
speculation. On the other hand, if the environment is random, the ¯rm can also take positive
38steps if it wants to do the opposite, i.e. if it wants to facilitate consumer speculation. To do
so, it can announce its price increases in advance. In a model where ¯rms are sel¯sh and
where there are purely administrative costs of changing prices this would seem unwise since
consumer that take advantage of temporarily low prices clearly lower ¯rm pro¯ts.
Interestingly, many ¯rms avail themselves of this opportunity and business newswires
contain many price announcements of this sort. To gain some perspective on how common
this is, I searched for \price increases," \announced" and \e®ective" in a publication that
regularly carries such notices, namely Business Wire. Con¯ning myself to the period 10/02 to
10/04 and ignoring the stories that matched my search criteria but were actually concerned
with other issues, I found 44 stories pertaining to companies who made announcements of
price increases. Of these, 14 (32%) announced price increases over one month in advance,
25 (57%) announced them less than one month in advance but over 10 days in advance and
only 5 announced that these would a®ect shipments that would take place in the next ten
days. Some of these pre-announcements specify that the new prices will apply to shipments
beyond a certain date, so it is not entirely clear to what extent they allow consumers to
speculate by buying goods before the planned price increase. Other stories are very speci¯c
on this point, however.
When Maxell, a large supplier of devices that store information on magnetic media,
announced on December 2, 2003 that the price of its main products would rise by about
10% in February 2004, it explicitly said it was giving advanced warning so that Maxell
customers would have \su±cient time to incorporate the pricing change into their future
business planning." Similarly, the September 15, 2004 announcement by GrafTech that it
was increasing electrode prices explicitly stated this price increase would only apply to orders
received after October 1. More generally, announcements made with a large degree of advance
notice such as Kimberly-Clark's announcement in March 2004 that it would increase its
Kleenex prices by midsummer give customers the capacity to respond.19
19While the intertemporal substitutability of the purchase of prepared co®ee might be subject to question,
it is interesting that Starbucks gave about 10 days notice before raising its prices in September 2004.
39I now consider a simple variant of the model I have developed in this section and show
that, under plausible circumstances, ¯rms that act altruistically would indeed avail them-
selves of the opportunity to preannounce price increases. The analysis proceeds in several
steps. First, I set up a discrete time version of the model and continue to let the ¯rm
optimize over the timing of its price changes. I use this model to compute the size of the
disappointment costs that are needed to rationalize a particular length of constant prices
for a given in°ation rate. Then, I suppose that (at least some) consumers are able to buy
the good one period in advance if the ¯rm preannounces its price increase. I then study nu-
merically whether, for the disappointment costs I computed in the ¯rst step, the ¯rm would
prefer to avoid this consumer disappointment by letting consumers know its price change in
advance. If the ¯rm does so, I have found parameters for which the ¯rm is unwilling to stick
with an equilibrium where it does not pre-announce its price increases.
To begin with, I suppose that periods have discrete length and that production and
consumption decisions get made once per period. I let i denote the one period interest rate













while consumer assets at t, At equal
At = (1 + i)At¡1 ¡ pt(qt + ^ qt+1) ¡ pztzt
where ^ qt are purchases of goods at t¡1 for use at t. I set these equal to zero for the moment,
though I relax this assumption when I consider preannouncements below. For consumers
not to strictly prefer a zero consumption of zt in any period, it must be that
½(1 + i) = (1 + ¹) (29)
where ¹ is the rate of growth of pzt, and I assume this from now on. This condition ensures
that consumers are indi®erent as to when they consumer the good z. This utility function
implies also that consumer demand for qt, d(p=pz) is given by (p=pz)¡² and that total utility
40from having access to this good at price p=pzt equals (p=pz)¡²=(² ¡ 1). An altruistic ¯rm's
welfare at t equals its pro¯ts in terms of good z at t plus ¸ times this consumer gain.
Supposing that marginal cost is constant in terms of good z so that it equals cpzt, an
altruistic ¯rm's instantaneous welfare is thus W(pt=pzt) where
W(pt=pzt) =





If the ¯rm keeps its price ¯xed for J periods and chooses the same real price s = pt=pzt
each time it changes its price, its total welfare is
PJ¡1
j=0 ½jW(s=(1 + ¹)j)
1 ¡ ½J ¡
¸`
1 ¡ ½J (30)
The ¯rm then sets s to maximize the ¯rst term, which gives
s =
²
² + ¸ ¡ 1
PJ¡1
j=0 ½j(1 + ¹)²j
PJ¡1
j=0 ½j(1 + ¹)(²¡1)j
To simplify the analysis I focus on the case where ` is independent of the size of the price
change and thus of J. For a given ¸` and for the value of s given above, the expression in
(30) reaches a maximum for at most two values of J. The reason is that this expression is
rising in J for low values of J (because the second term rises rapidly when J is low) and
falling in J when J is high (because the ¯rst term declines rapidly while the second term
rises more slowly). As ¸` rises, the second term becomes more important, so the optimal J




j ] such that the ¯rm
gains nothing by using a duration di®erent from J. For ¯` at the boundaries of this interval,
the ¯rm is indi®erent between this J and either the J that stands immediately below it (in
the case of r
¡
J ) or the one that stands immediately above it (in the case of r
+
J ).
Since prices increase by a factor (1+¹)J when they increase, we can easily deduce J from
observing the size of price increases. If we know the parameters of the model, we can then
also compute the range in which ¯` must fall. The question is then whether, for this range
of ¯`'s the ¯rm is better o® preannouncing the price increase. This presumably depends
on the precise e®ects of this preannouncement. Here, I consider a simple setting and show
41numerically that such a preannouncement can indeed increase an altruistic ¯rm's welfare
even though it lowers pro¯ts.
The particular example I have in mind is one where customers who are told of the period
t price increase at t¡1 can purchase both qt¡1 and qt at t¡1. Consumers buy each of these
units at a real price in terms of zt¡1 of s=(1+¹)J¡1, which given (29) is equivalent to a real
price in terms of zt of s=(½(1 + ¹)J¡1). Thus, the quantity ^ qt of these pre-purchases equals







Note that, if the ¯rm raises its price to s at t, consumers who have pre-purchased make no
further purchases as long as ½(1 + ¹)J¡1 is larger than one. If ½(1 + ¹)J¡1 < 1 instead, the
discount rate is su±ciently high that the consumer makes no pre-purchases. I thus consider
the case where in°ation is large enough that ½(1 + ¹)J¡1 > 1.
From the ¯rm's point of view, each unit sold of ^ qt delivers real revenues in terms of
zt of s=(½(1 + ¹)J¡1) and has real costs in terms of zt of c=½. Thus, an altruistic ¯rm's
instantaneous welfare from its sales of ^ qt in terms of zt equal
^ W =













If, the ¯rm did not preannounce its price increase, its instantaneous welfare from its sales at
t would be
W =





If the ¯rm did pre-announce, it would not necessarily set the same price s for t as if it did
not. However, to demonstrate that the ¯rm prefers preannouncing, it is su±cient to show
that it would have this preference even if it had to set the same price, and even if it could
never preannounce again in the future. The gain from this one time preannouncement would
then equal
^ W ¡ W + ¸`
42Take ¯rst the 1960's period studied by Cecchetti (1986). Supposing magazines keep their
prices constant for 107 periods of one month each, which I infer from the fact that they raise
their prices by 23.5% and the yearly in°ation is 2.4%, ¯` must equal between .239 and .246
if ² = 2, ¸ = :1 and ½ = :9975. The di®erence between W and ^ W is only .0032 for these
parameters, so that preannouncements are clearly bene¯cial to such an altruistic ¯rm. This
might, of course, induce even sel¯sh ¯rm to make these announcements so that they keep
their customers. Some intuition for this result, and its possible generality, can be gained by
noting that ^ W is nearly equal to the ¯rm's instantaneous welfare in the last period in which
it charges any given price. Thus, W ¡ ^ W is close to the increase in instantaneous welfare
that accrues in the period that the ¯rm raises its price. In continuous time, (27) ensures that
this di®erence equals the interest rate times the cost of changing prices ¸`. With discrete
time, this is not exactly right, but should be close if periods are short relative to the length
of time that prices remain ¯xed. Preannouncements, on the other hand, are worthwhile if
this di®erence in one-period gain equals the level of ¸`, which is of course much larger than
the real interest rate times ¸`. Thus, if periods are short relative to the length of time that
price remains constant, preannouncements are attractive. The ¯rm only loses the sales for
a brief period and avoids a great deal of consumer disappointment.
With the same ², ½ and ¸, and continuing to use monthly periods, but using the in°ation
rates and implied duration of constant prices of Cecchetti's (1986) magazines for the 1970's,
pre-announcement remains worthwhile for the entire range of possible ¸`'s. This is also
true in the case of the in°ation and implied duration of constant prices in the early period
studied by Lach and Tsiddon (1992). In their latter period, however, in°ation runs at 7.3%
per month and prices of the typical product change by 12.9% so that prices remain constant
for less than 2 months. Using periods of one month, preannouncements cease to be attractive
for the lower values of ¸` that are consistent with keeping prices constant for 2 months -
though they remain attractive for the higher values of ¸` that lead to this degree of price
rigidity.
436 Conclusions
If one is to have a \behavioral" theory of consumption, it seems important to sort out what
makes customers see a price as \fair," since lack of fairness in prices elicits strong reactions
by consumers. A perhaps equally important reason for seeking to model what consumers
regard as fair is that the e®ort to appear fair may explain a number of observations about
prices. Here I focused in particular on observation having to do with price rigidity and
price variability. I have, in particular, tried to rationalize simultaneously the existence
of \specials" where prices fall temporarily from their \regular" level, with the remarkable
rigidity of regular prices. I have argued at the same time that fairness considerations might
explain why prices seem more responsive to \costs" than to changes in marginal cost induced
by changes in demand. Lastly, I have used the same fairness-based logic to explain why prices
do not change in the face of certain natural disasters that increase demand, and to explain
some aspects of price rigidity that do not seem to ¯t well with a model where the only costs
of changing prices are administrative ones.
Because this is an initial e®ort at understanding the e®ects of a particular model of fair
prices, I have considered models without explicit uncertainty and with symmetric informa-
tion on the part of ¯rms and consumers. Both of these assumptions need to be relaxed
for the model to be more realistic. First, it is obvious that consumers have only imperfect
information about ¯rms' costs. Second, as I discussed above, ¯rms sometimes generate sub-
stantial animosity with their prices. Given that negative consumer reactions often lead ¯rms
to make changes, it would seem that ¯rms are also imperfectly informed about consumer's
trigger points. What remains as an open question is whether a model with uncertainty of
this type can explain one of the puzzling features of pricing found by Carlton (1986) and
Kashyap (1995). They found that ¯rms sometimes institute large price increases while they
institute small ones at other times. Models with administrative costs of price adjustment do
not tend to predict this heterogeneity. If, on the other hand, price rigidity is due to fears of
reactions by consumers, it would seem reasonable to suppose that the information available
44to ¯rms about these reactions a®ects the size of their price increases.
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47Figure 1: Costs and Bene¯ts of Shifting from One Market Clearing Price to Another






























8Figure 2: Costs and Bene¯ts of Shifting from One Market Clearing Price to Another: The
Case where Even Small Price Changes Cause a Discrete Increase in Disappointment
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Consumer Loss
Producer gain/l, l=.35
Producer gain/l, l=.45
f-f
0
G
a
i
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
s
s
e
s
4
9